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Intention in the Law of Property
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
John V. Orth
INTENTION IS A PERVASIVE concept in the law. Torts are traditionally divided into intentional and unintentional torts, 
although the meaning of the distinguishing 
characteristic requires some explanation; 
beginning law students are routinely baﬄed 
to discover that they can commit the “inten-
tional” tort of trespass by entering land in 
the innocent but mistaken belief that they 
have a right to be there. Intention is also an 
essential element of criminal law, although 
it too requires some explanation; “malice 
aforethought” does not demand quite the 
amount of time or mental eﬀort that one 
might think. Contract is probably the legal 
discipline in which intention is most promi-
nent; agreement is of the essence of contract, 
but the “meeting of the minds” is a legal, not 
a psychological, concept. “The law has noth-
ing to do with the actual state of the parties’ 
minds,” Oliver Wendell Holmes reminded 
his audience: “In contract, as elsewhere, it 
must go by externals, and judge parties by 
their conduct.”¹
Property law, too, must concern itself 
with intention, although it is generally more 
involved with the rights and responsibilities 
of ownership. Intention enters the law of 
property primarily when transfers of title are 
contemplated, particularly sales or gifts.² The 
sale of property is a matter of agreement and 
would properly be treated as part of contract 
law except that as to real property special 
doctrines are involved and a deed is required 
John V. Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.
  O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (88).
 2 Intention is also an element in the acquisition of personal property by ﬁnding and of real property by 
adverse possession, but these involve relatively small amounts of property. Unintentional deprivations 
of title occur in cases of forfeiture and loss of title to adverse possessors; inheritance and escheat operate 
as unintentional gratuitous transfers. Condemnation, or the taking of property by the power of emi-
nent domain, is an unintentional transfer for value (a forced sale) to the sovereign. As conceptualized 
ever since Blackstone, “[a]ll that the legislature does [in the exercise of the power of eminent domain] is 
to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price,” substituting one form of property 
for another. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 35 (765).
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to consummate the transaction.³ Intention is 
a necessary element of the law of gifts. Every 
law student learns that the requisites of an 
inter vivos gift are intention, delivery, and ac-
ceptance.⁴ Testamentary gifts are more com-
plicated: the requisite intention, the animus 
testandi, must be expressed in certain stereo-
typed ways, usually in a writing, signed by 
the testator and attested by two witnesses.⁵
Intention was not always the lodestar in 
the law that it is today. As Professor Patrick 
Atiyah has reminded us, for much of the 
history of the common law, “giving eﬀect to 
intentions” was not “the primary objective 
of the social order or of the law,”⁶ but since 
the time of Lord Mansﬁeld at the end of 
the eighteenth century, the steady triumph 
of individualism has reoriented many legal 
doctrines. In the modern world the biblical 
question, “Is it not lawful for me to do what I 
will with mine own?”⁷ is generally considered 
to be unanswerable. So obviously desirable 
has the eﬀectuation of intention become that 
it requires some eﬀort to recall that there are 
still legal rules, other than the criminal law, 
that are designed to frustrate it. Property law, 
in a sense the oldest part of the common law, 
remains the province of archaic and often in-
tention-defeating rules.⁸
“[W]e sit here,” explained an inﬂuential 
English judge in an important wills case, “not 
to try what the Testator may have intended, 
but to ascertain, on legal principles, what 
testamentary instruments he has made.”⁹ Or, 
putting it the other way around, in the words 
of a still earlier English judge, “after you have 
ﬁxed the intention, it then becomes a ques-
tion, whether such intention can be executed 
consistently with the established rules of law.”¹⁰ 
The Rule in Shelley’s Case, where it still ex-
ists, means that a grant of a life estate to A 
followed by a remainder in fee simple to A’s 
heirs will be construed to convey the entire 
estate to A without regard to the grantor’s 
intention, making it possible for A to alien-
ate or devise the property away from his or 
her heirs.¹¹ A joint tenant has nothing to de-
vise in the jointly owned property, no matter 
 3 The lease of real property, historically characterized as the conveyance of a non-freehold estate, is also 
dependent on intention, but the requisite intention is stereotypically indicated by the delivery of a 
signed document. See 29 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander’s, Inc., 387 N.E. 2d 205 (N.Y. 979).
 4 RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 38, p. 84 (2ⁿd ed. 955).
 5 THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 62, p. 293 (2ⁿd ed. 953) (“no will is valid 
unless there is compliance with all of the statutory requirements. The fact that the testator intended to 
comply … is not ground for relaxing the rules.”). Many states recognize holographic (handwritten) wills 
and a few, nuncupative (oral) wills; again, the statutory requirements must be strictly complied with.
 6 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 22 (979).
 7 Matt. 20:5 (KJ).
 8 The early common law has been described as “a primitive legal system which has a highly developed 
land law, but no theory of contract.” 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 355 
(4th ed. 936). See also John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 44, 45–49 (Harry N. Scheiber ed. 998). Without attention to contract with its insistence 
on intention, it was easier to focus on hard-and-fast rules and ignore expectations. 
 9 Croker v. Marquis of Hertford, 4 Moo. P.C. 339, 369, 3 Eng. Rep. 334, 344–45 (P.C. 844) (Lushington, 
Dr.). See S.M. WADDAMS, LAW, POLITICS AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: THE CAREER OF STEPHEN 
LUSHINGTON, 782–873 at 9–92 (992).
 0 Perrin v. Blake,  Collectanea Juridica 309, 30 (K.B. 770) (Yates, J., dissenting). Sir William Holdsworth, 
the great legal historian, described Yates’ dissent as “a complete answer to the view that, in construing 
a will, only the intention of the testator must be regarded.” 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 484 (938).
  See John V. Orth, The Mystery of the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 45 (2003). See also John V. 
Orth, Requiem for the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 67 N.C. L. REV. 68, 692 (989) (expressing the fervent hope
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how clearly expressed the intention.¹² Nor 
are intentional restraints on alienation valid 
except in certain trusts.¹³ At one time mort-
main statutes empowered surviving spouses 
and children to set aside gifts to charity in 
death-bed wills,¹⁴ and the ubiquitous stat-
utes that today grant a surviving spouse an 
elective share in the estate of the deceased 
partner are obviously intended to defeat an 
intention to reduce or eliminate the survivor’s 
share.¹⁵ The Rule Against Perpetuities, of 
course, is the most celebrated check on inten-
tion, and its chief expounder, John Chipman 
Gray, seemed to glory in the Rule’s intention- 
defeating potential:
The Rule against Perpetuities is not a 
rule of construction, but a peremptory 
command of law. It is not, like a rule of 
construction, a test, more or less artiﬁ-
cial, to determine intention. Its object 
is to defeat intention. Therefore every 
provision in a will or settlement is to 
be construed as if the Rule did not exist, 
and then to the provision so construed 
the Rule is to be remorselessly applied.¹⁶
Rules of construction, unlike rules of law, 
are supposed to eﬀectuate intention. By rais-
ing a rebuttable presumption that speciﬁc 
words and phrases have certain meanings, 
they reduce the likelihood of disputes and 
increase the speed and eﬃciency of property 
transactions. The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 
where it still exists, raises a presumption that a 
limitation in a deed, including a deed of trust, 
creating a remainder in the grantor’s heirs is 
actually intended to leave a reversion in the 
grantor, giving the grantor power to alienate 
or devise the property away from his or her 
heirs.¹⁷ Ambiguous terms in conveyances are 
construed to avoid the possibility of forfei-
that after the repeal of the Rule in North Carolina, the judges try to eﬀectuate intention and do not 
simply “do the opposite of what they would have done under the Rule”).
 2 See 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53 (2th ed., O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 873) (“A 
joint tenant has not an interest which is devisable” because “the survivor claims under the ﬁrst feoﬀor, 
which is title paramount to that of the devisee.”). For a criticism of this rule and its rationale, see R.H. 
Helmholz, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77 NEB. L. REV. , 29–30 (998).
 3 See Lewis M. Simes, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 3, p. 238 (2ⁿd ed. 966) (“all 
disabling restraints are void” except “restraints on alienation incident to beneﬁcial interests in spend-
thrift trusts”).
 4 For what appears to be the last remaining American mortmain statute, see GA. CODE § 53–2–0 (998). 
For what may have been the next-to-last, see NEW YORK EST., POWERS  TRUSTS LAW § 5–3.3 (re-
pealed 98). The earliest mortmain statutes required the donor to seek permission by statute or royal 
license before land could be transferred to a corporation, usually at that time some arm of the Church. 
For an historical survey, see SANDRA RABBAN, MORTMAIN LEGISLATION AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH, 
279–500 (982). To this day, the bad name for intention that seeks to extend its reach too far is control 
by the “dead hand” (mortmain).
 5 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-436 (998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30–3.ﬀ. (2000). Elective share 
statutes are found in all separate property states except Georgia. JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 480  n.  (6th ed. 2000). In community property states 
the spouses own all acquisitions from earnings after marriage in equal undivided shares. Only the state 
of Louisiana, where the civil law rather than the common law forms the basis of the law of succession, 
protects children in some circumstances from intentional disinheritance. LA. CONST. art. 2, § 5; LA. 
CIV. CODE arts. 493–54.
 6 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 629, p. 599 (4th ed., Roland Gray ed., 
942). The Rule Against Perpetuities, in Gray’s classic formulation, is “NO INTEREST IS GOOD 
UNLESS IT MUST VEST, IF AT ALL, NOT LATER THAN TWENTY-ONE YEARS 
AFTER SOME LIFE IN BEING AT THE CREATION OF THE INTEREST.” Id. § 20, p. 9 
(capitals in original). A simpler Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities has been adopted in 
many states. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4–5 ﬀ. (995).
 7 Although it began as a rule of law, the Doctrine of Worthier Title has, at least since Judge Benjamin
v8n1.indb   61 12/5/2004   8:47:49 PM
6 2  8  G R E E N  B A G  2 D  5 9
 J o h n  V.  O r t h
ture; in consequence, restrictive covenants 
are preferred to conditions subsequent, and 
fees subject to conditions subsequent to de-
terminable fees.¹⁸ Pretermission statutes are 
designed to carry out the testator’s presumed 
intention by providing for a neglected spouse 
or child.¹⁹ The same may be said of so-called 
anti-lapse statutes, substituting gifts to issue 
for gifts to deceased family members,²⁰ and 
statutes revoking testamentary gifts in favor 
of divorced spouses.²¹
While rules of construction are intended 
to eﬀectuate intention, they may in some cas-
es actually defeat it. Not only are mistakes in 
application possible, but the presumption in 
favor of one construction over another will 
resolve or preclude disputes in cases in which 
evidence is lacking or inconclusive. There are, 
in addition, rules of construction that, under 
the guise of eﬀectuating intention, are in fact 
designed to make it more diﬃcult to accom-
plish certain ends, permissible in themselves 
but viewed as undesirable or unlikely to be 
the product of informed choice. The butch-
er’s (or, rather, the judge’s) thumb weighs 
more heavily in some determinations of in-
tention than in others. The strong presump-
tion in favor of marketable title in contracts 
for the sale of land means that an agreement 
to convey land that is silent as to the title to 
be conveyed, even an agreement to convey by 
means of a quitclaim deed, is construed to be 
an agreement to convey a full marketable fee 
simple.²² Public policy in favor of an implied 
warranty of habitability in the sale of residen-
tial real estate is so strong that for a waiver to 
be eﬀective the contract of sale must explic-
itly refer to the “warranty of habitability” in 
ipsissima verba.²³ The class-closing rule in the 
law of trusts creates so powerful a presump-
tion that the settlor would prefer a class to 
close as soon as any member thereof can de-
mand distribution that it has been confused 
with a rule of law.²⁴ The presumption against 
agreements among cotenants not to partition 
means that an agreement to do “nothing to 
Cardozo’s landmark opinion in Doctor v. Hughes, 22 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 99), been generally regarded as 
a rule of construction, therefore rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. Not to be seen to interfere with 
intention even to this limited extent, a number of states have abolished the Doctrine of Worthier Title. 
See JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 776 (6th ed. 2000) 
(listing ten states).
 8 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45, comment m.
 9 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.30 (993) (pretermitted spouse); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 55:0 (974) (pre-
termitted child).
 20 See, e.g., TEX. PROBATE CODE § 68 (997). Statutes such as this one do not actually prevent lapse; rather, 
they substitute one gift for another under certain circumstances.
 2 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, § 9 (997). 
 22 See Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 00 N.E. 50 (N.Y. 92). See also UNIFORM LAND TRANSFER ACT § 2–
304(d) (“adopting … the rule of Wallach”).
 23 See Board of Managers v. Wilmette Partners, 760 N.E.2d 976 (Ill. 200) (holding waiver of “warranties 
of ﬁtness for particular purpose and merchantability” insuﬃcient to waive implied warranty of habit-
ability); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–70. (permitting waiver of warranties in the sale of new homes “only if 
the words used to waive, modify or exclude such warranties are conspicuously … set forth on the face 
of the contract in capital letters which are at least two points larger than the other type in the contract 
and only if the words used to waive, modify or exclude the warranties state with speciﬁcity the warranty 
or warranties that are being waived, modiﬁed or excluded … .”). In leases the implied warranty can often 
not be waived at all. See Javins, Saunders, and Gross v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 07, 082 (D.C. 
Cir. 970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42(b).
 24 See Re Wernher’s Settlement Trusts, [96]  All Eng. Rep. p. 84. Expert observers have conceded that 
the class closing rule is “adhered to more closely than any other rule of construction.” JESSE DUKEMINIER 
 STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 778 (6th ed. 2000).
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defeat the common tenancy” may not be in-
terpreted as intended to prohibit partition,²⁵ 
and the rule (usually statutory) in favor of 
tenancy in common means that a grant to 
two or more to hold “jointly” will not be con-
strued to create a joint tenancy.²⁶
Legal words are presumed to be used with 
their legal meanings, which is just a speciﬁc 
application of the general rule that where 
written words have what appears to be a plain 
meaning, that meaning is to be preferred over 
all others.²⁷ This seemingly simple rule may 
have unintended consequences. A scrivener 
may not translate the grantor’s intention into 
the right legal words. Instructed to draft a 
deed conveying title in joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship, the drafter might ne-
glect, out of ignorance or inadvertence, to 
use the form of words necessary in the juris-
diction.²⁸ Legal words may be used in a will, 
but the testator, if not the lawyer, may have 
understood them in another, less speciﬁc 
sense. The word “heirs,” for example, may be 
thought to include relatives such as in-laws 
and stepchildren not provided for in the rel-
evant statute of descent.²⁹
Rules concerning the manifestation of le-
gal intention have the eﬀect of making some 
manifestations ﬁnal, “privileging,” to use a 
modern expression, the intention of one 
time over another or of one form of expres-
sion (usually certain types of writing) over 
others. Inter vivos gifts are irrevocable once 
“completed,” and oral revocation of wills is 
not allowed. But the intention that originally 
supported the gift may have changed. In such 
cases there is ordinarily no remedy – unless 
the donor reserved a power of revocation, as 
in a conditional gift or revocable trust, or 
unless the law treats the act as inherently 
revocable as, for example, a gift causa mortis. 
Nor is the discernment of intention simple. 
It is notorious that fact-ﬁnders, both judges 
and juries, are capable of manipulating rules 
concerning mental capacity, undue inﬂuence, 
and fraud to upset unpopular or unconven-
tional dispositions in wills, so much so that 
one scholar has dismissed freedom of testa-
tion as no more than a “myth.”³⁰
Formal requirements are meant to ensure 
 25 See Michalski v. Michalski, 42 A.2d 645 (N.J. 958) (reversing trial court’s ﬁnding that the agreement 
did not prohibit partition but refusing to enforce it anyway because of “changed circumstances”).
 26 See Mustain v. Gardner, 67 N.E. 779 (Ill. 903); In re Estate of Hillyer, 664 So.2d 36 (Fla. 995). See also 
John V. Orth, Joint Tenancies in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS EDITION § 3.06(d), pp. 
20–2 (994). If two grantees are married to one another, there may be a presumption that they are to 
hold as tenants by the entirety. This was the common law rule, see John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety 
in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS EDITION § 33.06(a), pp. 02–04 (994), and it has been 
adopted by statute in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.5.0(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39–3.6(b).
 27 Suﬀolk Business Ctr. v. Applied Digital Data, 58 N.E.2d 320, 322 (N.Y. 99) (construing a deed). See 
also THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 46, p. 8 (2nd ed. 953) (“If the 
testator employed a draftsman skilled in the use of technical words these must be given their technical 
meaning.”). The practical eﬀect of the plain meaning rule is to exclude evidence of other possible mean-
ings. 
 28 See n. 26, supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed that in that state “[t]o create a right of 
survivorship the normal procedure is to employ the phrase [as] ‘joint tenants, with a right of survivor-
ship, and not as tenants in common’.” In re Estate of Michael, 28 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. 966) (italics in 
original). In Michigan the same form of words has been held to create an estate for joint lives with 
alternative contingent remainders in the survivor. Jones v. Green, 337 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. App. 983).
 29 Cf. Mahoney v. Grainger, 86 N.E. 86 (Mass. 933) (rejecting proﬀer of evidence that testatrix under-
stood “heirs” to mean her ﬁrst cousins, when she had a surviving aunt who was her actual heir under the 
relevant statute).
 30 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (996) (examining cases on 
undue inﬂuence and will formalities). There is a distinction between the intention that a transaction be
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that intention properly expressed is given ef-
fect,³¹ but they may operate in some cases to 
defeat intention. Although donative intent 
may be established, a gift may nonetheless 
fail for want of delivery.³² Perhaps the most 
troubling cases concern attempted testamen-
tary gifts: failure to satisfy certain formal 
requirements, typically involving a writing, 
signature, and witnesses, may result in the 
frustration of the obvious intention of a 
person now deprived by death of the ability 
to cure the defect.³³ The remedy most com-
monly proposed for the frustration of testa-
mentary intent by failure to comply with the 
proper forms is simply to devolve upon legal 
decision-makers discretion to accept as wills 
documents that do not in fact comply with 
the statute.
As amended in 990, the Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC), in a section adopted in half a 
dozen states, provides:
Although a document … was not ex-
ecuted in compliance with [the formali-
ties required of wills], the document … 
is treated as if it had been executed in 
compliance … if the proponent of the 
document … establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the decedent 
intended the document … to constitute 
… the decedent’s will … .³⁴
There exists some confusion about the exact 
nature of this provision. The UPC itself treats 
the section as if it merely excused “harmless 
error,” but at least one court has described it 
as adopting a “doctrine of substantial com-
pliance,”³⁵ while commentators generally 
admit that it confers on the courts a plenary 
“dispensing power,” that is, the power to dis-
pense with the statutory requirements alto-
gether if necessary to eﬀectuate intention.³⁶ 
eﬀective and intention with respect to the meaning of some of its terms, but in practice a fact-ﬁnder can 
negate the substantive intent by failing to ﬁnd the operative intent.
 3 In their classic analysis of the role of formal requirements in the law of testation, Gulliver and Tilson 
identiﬁed ritual, evidentiary, and protective functions, while insisting that the forms “should not be 
revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intention.” Ashbel G. Gulliver  
Catherine J. Tilson, Classiﬁcation of Gratuitous Transfers, 5 YALE L. J. , 3, 5–3 (94). Frequent failure 
to comply with formal requirements may indicate that the requirements are not congruent with com-
mon expectations.
 32 Foster v. Reiss, 2 A.2d 553, 560 (N.J. 955) (gift causa mortis) (“Although the writing establishes her 
donative intent at the time it was written, it does not fulﬁll the requirement of delivery of the property, 
which is a separate and distinct requirement … .”).
 33 The same dilemma arises in the law of inter vivos gifts when litigation over donative intent occurs after 
the death of the donor.
 34 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2–503 (harmless error).
 35 In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 339, 343 (N.J. 99). Substantial compliance seems to require at least 
some compliance or attempted compliance.
 36 JESSE DUKEMINIER  STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 25–52, 259–6 (6th ed. 
2000). Harmless error, as its name implies, seems to admit some error, however minor, in compliance; 
a dispensing power, on the other hand, suggests no need to comply (or attempt to comply) at all. To 
the historically minded, there is something more than a little odd in the candid recognition of a judicial 
power to “dispense” with the requirements of a statute. The King of England’s claim to such a power in 
the seventeenth century precipitated a constitutional crisis, and in response the English Bill of Rights 
speciﬁcally forbade the practice.  W.  M., st. 2, ch. 2, § I, clauses –2 (689). The threat still seemed real 
enough a century later so that the generation that made the American Revolution included in several 
state constitutions an express prohibition against “the power of suspending laws, or the execution of 
laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people.” See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 
776, Declaration of Rights § 5. Indeed, it is still there in some constitutions today. N.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 7 (same). Where the UPC section conferring the dispensing power is adopted by statute rather than 
judicial ﬁat, the constitutional requirement of the “consent of the representatives of the people” would 
seem to be satisﬁed.
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Thus does intention trump form; or, more 
precisely, thus does the judicial determina-
tion of intention trump the legislative pre-
scription of form.
A troubling illustration of the problem is 
provided in Johnson v. Johnson, a 954 wills 
case from Oklahoma.³⁷ Dexter Johnson, 
himself a lawyer who had prepared many 
wills in proper form for his clients, left at his 
death a typed document appearing to be his 
own will but neither signed nor witnessed.³⁸ 
At its foot appeared a handwritten and 
signed statement leaving a nominal gift to 
his brother and reciting the seemingly obvi-
ous fact that “[t]his will shall be complete un-
less hereafter altered, changed or rewritten.”³⁹ 
Devisavit vel non? Local law permitted holo-
graphic wills and codicils, so the handwrit-
ten part could be probated, assuming testa-
mentary intent was found. But what of the 
typewritten part? The lower courts rejected 
the entire document, but the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reversed in a confused opin-
ion relying largely on the argument that the 
typewritten “will” had been “republished” by 
the handwritten “codicil.”⁴⁰
Associate Justice Nelson S. Corn con-
curred in the result and authored a preco-
cious statement of the doctrine of substan-
tial compliance: “It was not the intent of our 
law-makers, in enacting these statutes, if 
substantially complied with, to ever allow a 
miscarriage of justice by a wrongful disposi-
tion of the testator’s property contrary to his 
intent.”⁴¹ Not interested in technical subtle-
ties, Justice Corn would have held simply that 
“[i]n the instant case, the intent expressed by 
the testator … is clear and beyond any ques-
tion.”⁴² One might applaud the justice’s opin-
ion as the triumph of substance over form if 
the evidence was as unequivocal as he said it 
was – and if the justice himself had not been 
one of America’s most corrupt judges!⁴³
Students and commentators alike too 
often assume that the choice is between a 
regime of rules with the potential to defeat 
intention and the simple eﬀectuation of in-
tention without regard to rules. In fact, the 
 37 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 954).
 38 No lawyer who has ever supervised the elaborate ceremony of executing a written attested will could 
possibly think that he had executed his own will without signature or witnesses. For the recommended 
method of executing a will, see  A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 3.. (6th ed. 998 with Jeﬀrey 
N. Pennell).
 39 279 P.2d at 933 (photocopy of original document). As every lawyer knows, wills are inherently revocable 
and ambulatory. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § , p. 2 (2ⁿd ed. 953).
 40 “Publication” of a will is deﬁned as “the signiﬁcation by the testator to the witnesses that the instrument 
is his will.” THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 68, p. 327 (2ⁿd ed. 953). Since 
the typewritten part had never been “published” in the ﬁrst place, it necessarily follows that it cannot 
have been “republished.” It is at least arguable that the handwritten part was not a holographic codicil 
but a holographic will that incorporated the typewritten part by reference.
 4 279 P.2d at 932 (Corn, J., concurring).
 42 Id. The evidence did not seem so clear to the judges of the district and county courts or to the three 
Supreme Court justices who dissented in the case.
 43 See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 44, 46 (Okla. 967) (describing bribe-taking by Justice Corn over 
more than twenty years but ﬁnding no evidence that bribery inﬂuenced the decision in this particular 
case). Justice Corn’s defense of judicial discretion unfortunately brings to mind a famous outburst by 
Lord Camden, himself a distinguished judge:
the discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is diﬀerent in diﬀerent 
men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, and passion. In the best it is often times 
caprice, in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable. 
Doe v. Kersey (C.P. 765), quoted in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE 
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 356 (992). A more sinister example can
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choice is between rules to guide decision-
makers and entrusting them with still more 
discretion. Granting judges the authority to 
accept less than the prescribed formalities 
in the law of wills, while perhaps reducing 
the likelihood of intention-defeating deci-
sions, will also have the necessary conse-
quence of requiring extensive fact-ﬁnding in 
many cases that do not eventually result in 
the “clear and convincing” establishment of 
the decedent’s intention.⁴⁴ And – in light 
of the evidence that fact-ﬁnders already 
manipulate the rules in order to defeat sub-
stantive dispositions – it will only increase 
the opportunity for abuse. Without ﬁdelity 
to rules to use as a standard by which to 
review judicial performance, judges may es-
cape eﬀective oversight: faulting “judgment 
calls” is far more diﬃcult than detecting 
lapses in the application of rules. In the end, 
the commendable intention to eﬀectuate 
intention may instead lead only to conse-
quences that are as unfortunate as they are 
unintended. 
hardly be imagined than the fate of the German “free law movement” (Freirechtsbewegung). Founded 
by well-meaning academics Eugen Ehrlich and Hermann Kantorowicz in the early twentieth century, 
it was a reaction against an excessively strict application of the German Civil Code, such as the in-
validation of a will that was not “subscribed” because signed on the same line as the date. Kantorowicz 
recommended that in such a case a judge ought to be free to reach a result in keeping with social values. 
Unfortunately during the Nazi era the idea of departing from the language of the Code in favor of the 
“spirit of the law” was taken to horrifying extremes. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN 
LEGAL THEORY 359–6 (992).
 44 Judges actually prefer to work with rules, both to ensure fairness and to economize their time and eﬀort, 
and in the absence of rules generate them spontaneously. In certain Australian states that have given 
judges a dispensing power, the cases have “produced a ranking of the Wills Act formalities … , devalu-
ing attestation while insisting on signature and writing.” John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in 
the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. , 
52–54 (987). In other words, the judges have simply amended the Wills Act.
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